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6.1  Introduction 
In Japan, we  are now facing a powerful policy trend reconsidering the 
role of the government in economic policy, and a consensus is emerging 
that deregulation is the only way to revitalize the economy as a whole, 
to recover international competitiveness,  and to benefit consumers. But 
sometimes even those who advocate deregulation as a general economic 
principle will object to policy change because an individual policy is likely 
to hurt their interests. This tendency is a general truth all over the world, 
but it seems to me that we  Japanese do not have as much confidence in 
the market mechanism as Anglo-Saxon countries, and that this is a reason 
why dramatic policy change cannot happen in Japan. 
Naturally, transport policies in Japan are very conservative. Entry and 
policing have been regulated tightly in almost all transport modes and the 
room for effective competition among carriers is very restricted, though 
procompetitive policies have been  adopted recently, especially since the 
mid- 1980s. 
Air transport policy is no exception. The air transport industry has been 
and still is regulated  by  the Ministry of Transport (MOT) based  on the 
Civil Aeronautics Law, although some changes were made to introduce a 
competitive situation in the past decade. As is well known, the worldwide 
trend is to deregulate the airline industry and to promote competition in 
both domestic and international markets, making the markets more eff- 
cient and increasing consumer benefits. However, the changes in Japanese 
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air transport policy are gradual and step by  step and far from the total 
deregulation introduced in the United States in 1978. 
Such cautious policy operations could be appropriate given the general 
dislike ordinary Japanese people have for radical policy change. The most 
important point, however, is whether or not the true purpose of the policy 
change is  to reform the industrial  structure significantly, and from the 
viewpoint of economists, this is not the case in the air transport industry. 
Air transport passengers hardly  realize any economic benefits from the 
policy changes. For example, the Japanese government introduced a zone 
fare system in domestic markets on 1 June 1996 and fares became much 
more diverse than before, but some consumers criticized the diversity of 
fares and some complained about the fare hikes they were forced to face. 
The essence of this policy failure is clearly the lack of effective competition 
even on “double or triple trucking” routes, where two or three carriers offer 
services, and the difficulties faced by new carriers trying to enter markets. 
The purpose of this paper is to survey and to evaluate air transport 
policy in  Japan. In section 6.2 I investigate the history  of  air transport 
policy, and in section 6.3 I examine briefly the effect of policy changes 
made in the past decade. In section 6.4 international air transport aspects 
will be discussed, and I will try to make some assessment of the policy in 
section 6.5. 
6.2  Regulatory Mechanisms 
The Japanese air transport market developed in a strictly regulated envi- 
ronment. The Civil Aeronautics Law, which governs the industry, requires 
that firms obtain government licenses to enter the market. Airlines also 
need government approval for their fares, and even for their annual bus- 
iness  plans.  Naturally,  international  routes  also  require  government- 
negotiated bilateral  agreements with other countries. In this, Japan has 
been a traditionalist. The agreements the Japanese government has con- 
cluded with other countries are generally modeled on the old Bermuda 
Agreement,  reached  in  1944  between  the  United  States  and  United 
Kingdom. 
6.2.1  Industrial Policy in Air Transport: An Old Regime 
Just after World War 11, commercial aviation in Japan was banned by 
the Allied forces, and it was not until  1951 that a Japanese airline was 
allowed to commence service. In that year, the oldest airline, Japan Air- 
lines (JAL) was founded as a private company, but in 1953 the company 
was reorganized as a special public corporation. The purpose of this re- 
organization was to strengthen JAL‘s international competitiveness. 
Also in  1953, two domestic carriers were founded and started service. 
However, both companies were in poor financial condition, so the Japa- Toward a More Liberal Sky in Japan  197 
nese government proposed that they merge into one company and they 
did so in 1958. This was the birth of All Nippon Airways (ANA) and the 
first stage of the industrial consolidation in aviation by governmental ini- 
tiative. 
Besides JAL and ANA, six regional carriers were founded in the late 
1950s. These  carriers  also  suffered  from  deficits.  Some of  them  were 
merged into ANA, but two of  them, Japan Domestic Airways and Toa 
Airways survived until the end of the  1960s. In the second half of the 
1960s, Japan Domestic developed a cooperative arrangement with ANA, 
as Toa did with JAL. As a result, it was thought to be appropriate that 
each company merge with its partner. 
However, this prediction  was never realized because the government 
changed its policy. The Cabinet Meeting Resolution Concerning Airline 
Operations of 1970 suggested that Japan Domestic and Toa should merge 
into one company and that commercial aviation in Japan should be oper- 
ated by a three-company system: JAL, ANA, and Toa Domestic Airways 
(TDA), which was the company that Japan Domestic and Toa formed. 
The government had several reasons for choosing the three-airline sys- 
tem over the two-airline system. First, air transport demand at that time 
was growing quickly, and this was part of the official reasoning for the 
necessity of third airline. Second, there was strong political pressure from 
a particular corporate group to make a third airline, and this pressure 
could change government policy-though  this was not part of the official 
reasoning. In any case, the birth of TDA was the second stage of the indus- 
trial consolidation by governmental initiative. 
The government not only initiated  the consolidation  policy but  also 
used  regulatory mechanisms to establish the three-company  system. In 
1972, the MOT  announced the Ministry Guidance Regarding Airline Op- 
erations,  which  gave  JAL  international  business  and  domestic  trunk 
routes, ANA short-distance international charters and domestic opera- 
tions, and TDA domestic local routes and some trunk route services. 
The intention of this system was to stabilize the business condition of 
the three companies. According to the government’s  understanding at that 
time, the Japanese  airline business was  in  its infancy and so unstable 
enough that it could not survive in a competitive environment. Since the 
only lucrative markets for Japanese carriers were domestic trunk routes 
(Sapporo-Tokyo-Osaka-Fukuoka-Naha),  whether  or not carriers could 
obtain licenses to operate on trunk routes was a crucial factor for their 
business. 
The  1970 cabinet resolution consolidated two rather small companies 
into a relatively big one and made it possible to derive economies of scale. 
It also meant that TDA got the ability to offer proper services on large 
trunk routes and that it could use money from trunk routes to compensate 
deficits on local routes. Things were the same for the other two airlines. 198  Hirotaka Yamauchi 
JAL could make up losses incurred in international services and ANA 
could cross-subsidize losses on domestic local routes, both using surpluses 
from trunk routes. 
The cabinet resolution  and the 1972 ministry guidance were together 
called the “aviation constitution” because they determined the basic mar- 
ket structure of the Japanese airline industry and because airlines could 
not expand their business beyond the assigned fields. This “old regime” 
was intended to secure and nurture the capacity of all the airline compa- 
nies by establishing segmented business fields for each firm. Segmentation 
of markets was also a common feature of Japanese industrial policy in the 
1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s. In air transport, route-licensing regulation 
made the segmentation concrete and trunk route markets offered a base 
for financial stability and a source for cross-subsidization. 
The old regime survived until the mid-l980s, with all three firms grow- 
ing steadily within their arranged business bases. The air transport market 
as a whole grew rapidly with the help of the great economic expansion in 
Japan, and the route network was widened. Governmental intervention in 
the form of protection for an infant industry could be said to have func- 
tioned adequately up to this stage. 
But the most serious problem of this cartel-oriented government policy 
was the high-cost nature of Japanese airlines brought about by protection 
from  competition,  and this problem  remained  even  after  the circum- 
stances surrounding the airline industry changed. The government did not 
face up to the reality of the market and was unwilling to discard old beliefs 
in regulatory mechanisms. In the earlier stage, the benefits of a wider net- 
work and stability in service provision might, to some extent, have out- 
weighed the costs of distorting allocative efficiency. This ranking of cost 
and benefit soon reversed, however, because as the airlines matured opera- 
tional inefficiencies grew and consumers were forced to bear unnecessary 
cost increases. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, consolidating small companies into large 
ones was a common measure in Japan’s general industrial policy. As a 
matter of form, the government-initiated mergers in the airline industry 
resemble the industrial policies pursued by the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry in such fields as iron and automobile manufacturing. 
But there was a clear difference between the consolidations in the airline 
industry and those in other fields: while keen competition both domesti- 
cally and internationally  played a major role in other industries, in air 
transport, the leading actor was the government itself, which prevented 
the market from working effectively. 
6.2.2  Policy Change in the Past Decade 
The old air transport regime collapsed in the mid-1980s. The trigger was 
the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Aviation Treaty Interim Agreement of 
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stated, the strategy of the Japanese government in the 1970s was to limit 
international scheduled carrier service to JAL, but for international air 
cargo transport, it was insisted that one more carrier should be allowed to 
provide service to meet the rapidly growing international air cargo de- 
mand. For this reason, a new airline, Nippon Cargo Airways (NCA), was 
formed, and it applied to the government for a route license to serve the 
north Pacific market. This application met with intense debate on whether 
or not the company should be licensed, but finally the government ac- 
cepted it and started negotiating with the US. government over the entry 
of NCA into the north Pacific market. The 1985 interim agreement was 
the result of this negotiation. 
The interim agreement admitted the new  entry of NCA; moreover, it 
allowed other new carriers, from both Japan and the United States, to 
start scheduled passenger service. Naturally, to make this possible, it was 
necessary for the government to end JAL‘s scheduled international service 
monopoly among Japanese carriers. Around this time, calls for the liberal- 
ization of the Japanese domestic air industry also strengthened, and the 
Council for Transport Policy (an official advisory committee to the minis- 
ter) announced its opinion that the old regime formed in the first half of 
the 1970s should be abolished, and that a more procompetitive air trans- 
port policy should be pursued. The content of  its detailed advice was as 
follows: 
1.  International routes should be served by multiple carriers. 
2.  Competition on domestic routes should be promoted by new entry 
3. JAL should be completely privatized. 
After receiving the report, the Japanese government immediately issued 
a cabinet resolution abolishing the old regime. But with respect to domes- 
tic competition, the council argued that “an American style of  deregula- 
tion does not suit the circumstances of Japan” because of the capacity 
limitations of Tokyo International (Haneda) Airport and Osaka Interna- 
tional (Itami) Airport and the different competitive strengths of airlines. 
It is very common in every country that airport congestion problems im- 
pede fair market competition, but it seemed to be some kind of legacy 
from the paternalistic government policy of the old days that airlines’ com- 
petitive strengths were taken into account in adopting a liberal policy. 
Implementing a competition policy in the domestic market, the govern- 
ment set up a system whereby several carriers could enter each city-pair 
market. Under the criteria adopted, three companies could offer service 
on routes that carried one million passengers or more annually, and two 
companies on routes that carried 700,000 passengers or more annually. 
These criteria have been gradually relaxed since the introduction of the 
system. 
The government has insisted that domestic aviation has become more 
into particular city-pair markets. 200  Hirotaka Yamauchi 
competitive because of the new aviation policy adopted in 1986. However, 
the system has met strong criticisms that the government’s regulation of 
fare approval and entry licensing has remained basically unchanged,  so 
even though several carriers compete on the same routes, these routes are 
subject to an entirely uniform fare structure except for inclusive tour fares. 
The government persisted in fare regulation in the early 1990s, while 
trying  to evade criticism  by  relaxing entry  conditions into double- or 
triple-trucking routes. The main reason why the government persisted in 
price regulation is that it knew intense competition between carriers would 
make it difficult to maintain thin local routes through cross-subsidies and 
it feared such a situation. Long-time regulation had created vested inter- 
ests in subsidized areas, and these interests kept putting political pressure 
on the government. It was in 1995 that the MOT  finally adopted a policy 
that made it easier to offer discounted fares. However, this policy could 
not calm the critics, and there emerged strong calls for further liberaliza- 
tion of airfares. Responding to these demands, the government adopted a 
zone fare system in 1996. 
The zone fare system adopted in Japan is similar to that adopted by the 
European Community (now the European Union) before the third pack- 
age of the Common Air Transport Policy was implemented in  1993. The 
system involves establishing a fixed price range and allowing carriers to 
set their airfares within that range at their own discretion. For example, 
carriers can set relatively high prices in peak travel periods and offer pro- 
motional fares during off-peak periods. Needless to say, this system allows 
carriers to respond to particular demand periods with a flexible fare struc- 
ture. Carriers can introduce and set all types of discount fares, including 
advance purchase fares, to meet demand in different periods. 
The upper limit of the permitted fare zone is initially calculated on the 
basis of the airlines’ cost level. The lower end of the range is set at 25 
percent less than the upper limit. This range is for normal fares. The car- 
rier can set discount fares at most 50 percent below the lower limit. Logi- 
cally, the deepest discount fare could be set at 62.5 percent off  the upper 
limit fare, though it is not likely that such fares emerge. The possibility 
that fares diversify and are lower on average depends on the effectiveness 
of competition in each market. Again, the crucial point is barrier to new 
entries.’ 
As stated above, the MOT  is maintaining the authority to issue route 
licenses, and this means the air transport market in Japan is still under 
regulation. But of course regulation is not the only barrier to new entry. 
Actually, the biggest problem is, as mentioned earlier, the limited capacity 
of Haneda Airport (airport capacity limitation in the Osaka area disap- 
peared with the completion of Kansai International Airport). Haneda is 
1. For details, see section 6.3 and Yamauchi (1996). Toward a More Liberal Sky in Japan  201 
the biggest profit engine for domestic carriers, and any restriction on the 
number of landing slots poses a serious obstacle to new market entry. 
In Japan, the MOT  allocates landing slots for domestic flights, and there 
has been a widespread outcry over the opaqueness of the decision-making 
process. Mainly economists insist that the process should be based on an 
open and visible bidding  system, or determined  by  a price mechanism 
such as peak load pricing. However, the MOT  has expressed its concern 
that  a bidding  system or other  market-oriented allocation mechanism 
would benefit those carriers with the largest current market  shares and 
capital reserves and would only increase market differentials among the 
competing carriers. 
The concern of the government could be reasonable, if  we  agreed that 
the purpose of air transport policy in Japan is  to nurture the industry. 
However, Japanese air carriers have grown up, and this paternalistic policy 
stance has left the overwhelming problem of high costs among the carriers. 
It is market forces that drive airlines to be more efficient and more compet- 
itive, and effective competition among efficient carriers could  produce 
benefits for consumers.* 
6.3  An Evaluation of Market Competition 
in the market structure of air transport in Japan.3 
6.3.1  Demand Structure 
The air transport market in Japan has been developing steadily. The 
five-year growth rates in the number of air passengers are 9.7 (1975-SO), 
1.6 (1980-85),  8.3 (1985-90),  and 3.7 percent (1990-95).  The trend is that 
air demand increase rates exceeded GDP growth rates except for the first 
half of 1980s, when the capacity of Haneda Airport was a bottleneck hin- 
dering supply increase. Thereafter, the expansion plan for Haneda was 
implemented, and capacity has been increased grad~ally.~  As a result, the 
air transport market in Japan is not small for the geographical size of the 
country. Total revenue passenger kilometers in the domestic market are 
about 65 billion, which is one-tenth of that in United States, and the 78 
million passengers on domestic routes are equivalent to one-sixth of the 
U.S. market (these data are for 1995). 
In this section I investigate briefly the changes caused by the new policy 
2. On 5 December  1996, the MOT announced a new policy guideline, which is directed 
3.  A more comprehensive analysis is done in Yamauchi and Murakami (1995). 
4.  The first phase of this expansion plan, including the opening of a new runway (called 
the New A), was completed in July 1988, and this spring another new runway (called the 
New C) was opened. New C expanded capacity substantially (13.8 percent), and this trig- 
gered new competition not only among incumbent carriers but also from new entrants. 
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Using time-series data for 1974-95,  I estimated the aggregate demand 
function as follows: 
1nRPK  =  10.157 - 0.741  lnRFARE 
(5.430)  (-3.665) 
+  1.292  InRGDP,  adjusted R2  =  0.982, 
(12.782) 
where RPK is revenue passenger kilometers, RFARE is real airfare (do- 
mestic yields per revenue passenger kilometer, deflated by  the consumer 
price index), and RGDP is real GDP.5 
Simple aggregate demand function analysis indicates that the long-term 
price elasticity of domestic air travel is about  -0.74  and the long-term 
income  elasticity  is  about  +  1.29. Compared  with  estimates  by  Ohta 
(1981), who suggests that the price and income elasticities are -0.83  and 
+  1.66, respectively, our estimates show that income elasticity decreased 
because a newer data set was used. In any case, air travel in Japan’s domes- 
tic market is a so-called normal good. 
The most important feature of  air transport demand in Japan is the 
concentration on Tokyo-related routes. Needless to say, Haneda Airport 
located in Tokyo is the busiest airport: it deals with about 55.1 percent of 
total air passengers in Japan (see fig. 6.1), although routes that originate 
or terminate at Haneda account for only 17.9 percent of all routes. Many 
dense markets are among the Haneda-related routes (see fig. 6.2), which 
include the Tokyo-Sapporo route, whose annual traffic is 7.6 million pas- 
sengers, and the Tokyo-Fukuoka route, with 6.2 million passengers. As is 
well known, Tokyo-Sapporo is the biggest market in the world, and Tokyo- 
Fukuoka also ranks high by  route density.6 On the other hand, Osaka 
(Kansai)-Sapporo is the only route ranked among the ten biggest domestic 
markets in Japan other than Tokyo-related routes. 
These features of Japan’s air transport demand suggest that operating 
directly to and from Haneda is a crucial factor in an airline’s ability to 
make profits. It may be possible for Japanese air carriers to operate healthy 
non-Tokyo routes, but it is clear that their high-cost nature prevents them 
from doing so, given the lack of workable competition. 
6.3.2  Operators 
Including the big three carriers, eight scheduled airline companies oper- 
ate in Japan. Two, Japan Asia Airlines (JAA) and NCA, offer only interna- 
tional service, and two others, Japan Trans-Ocean Airlines (JTA) and Ja- 
5. I estimated several other functional forms including a dummy variable that stands for 
significant fatal accidents, but the simplest one, cited above, was the best fit. 
6.  The top three markets in the United States are New York-Los  Angeles, New York- 
Chicago, and New York-Washington, D.C. Annual traffic on each of these routes is between 
2.5 and 2.7 million passengers. Toward a More Liberal Sky in Japan  203 
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Fig. 6.2  Route structure of air transport in Japan 
pan Air  Commuter (JAC), are solely  domestic carriers. The remaining 
company, Air Nippon (ANK), is mainly domestic but recently started one 
international route: Fukuoka-Taipei. 
The biggest airline in Japan is JAL. In  1995, JAL carried about 72.4 
billion RPK in domestic and international markets, which is half to a third 
of the traffic of an American megacarrier. The second carrier ANA's  out- 
put was  about 43.8 billion RPK, and that  of  Japan Air Systems (JAS; 
formerly TDA) was 13.7 billion RPK. 
When  the Japanese economy enjoyed  an overheated business boom 204  Hirotaka Yamauchi 
from the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s, the airlines also 
made big profits. After that period, as the economy decelerated, the busi- 
ness condition of the airlines declined too, and they began to accrue big 
deficits. Only now are business conditions in the air transport market be- 
coming stable, but as we  shall see later, airlines are still undergoing busi- 
ness restructuring. 
As pointed out in section 6.2, one purpose of tight regulation in Japa- 
nese air transport market is to maintain cross-subsidization between trunk 
routes and local routes. This means that air carriers whose main business 
is in local markets may well have a lot of unprofitable routes, but since in 
Japan profit and loss accounts by route are not transparent, we  cannot 
analyze the cross-subsidization mechanism in detail. Sometimes it is said 
that two-thirds of JAS's routes are loss making, and this assertion then 
grounds objections to a system of free entry and exit. According to the 
general claim, under such a system, routes for which demand is thin and 
that are therefore unprofitable will  likely be abandoned, and the welfare 
of passengers on such routes without substitutable transport modes will 
suffer. 
But from the viewpoint of economists, the best solution to this problem 
is to maintain services by general subsidy from the government. Such mea- 
sures have been implemented  in the United  States as the Essential Air 
Service Program and are also provided in the third package of the Com- 
mon Air Transport Policy in the European Union. The Japanese govern- 
ment is now groping for a new direct subsidy system to be implemented 
at the next stage of air transport liberalization.' 
6.3.3  Market Structure 
In the old regime, ANA had a major share of the domestic market, but 
since 1986 its share has gradually declined. As figure 6.3 shows, ANA's 
share dropped from 57.4 percent in  1985 to 47.2 percent in  1994. In a 
sense, this was a result of the liberalization of domestic air transport mar- 
kets, but it should be noted that the shares of ANA's competitors did not 
increase dramatically. JAL and JAS raised their shares from 23.3 to 26.7 
percent and 17.2 to 19.9 percent, respectively, but at the same time, ANK, 
which is a subsidiary of ANA, increased its share by 2.5 percentage points. 
ANA transferred its unprofitable routes to its subsidiary to make its own 
financial position healthier. In conclusion, the policy adopted in the mid- 
1980s has not led to a radical change in market structure. 
There are some reasons why ANA has not lost share dramatically. ANA 
has a  strong sales network and brand  loyalty in  the domestic market, 
7. In April 1998, the Council for Transport Policy submitted a report on the further liberal- 
ization of  air transport markets, in which it was proposed that a new subsidy program be es- 
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Fig. 6.3  Changes in domestic market shares 
Note: Share percentages are as follows: For  1984: ANA, 57.4; JAL, 23.3; JAS,  17.2; JTA, 
1.4; ANK, 0.7; JAC 0. 0. For  1994: ANA, 47.2; JAL, 26.7; JAS, 19.9; JTA, 2.5; ANK, 3.2; 
JAC. 0.5. 
which were nurtured under the old regime and are probably the main rea- 
sons for ANA's  competitive strength. Moreover, until very recently, fare 
competition has been banned, and new competitors had no effective way 
to challenge incumbent carriers. In a sense, this was a legacy of the old 
regulatory environment. 
Another reason why  shares did not change greatly is airport capacity 
limitations. As stated earlier, Haneda Airport, the biggest profit center for 
carriers, does not have enough capacity; and the number of landing slots 
at the airport has not increased much, although an expansion project is 
now under way. In such a situation, an incumbent carrier that has a lot of 
slots at Haneda can use its advantageous position in competing with other 
carriers, because the regulator treats the vested interest of the incumbent 
carrier as something unchangeable. 
On the other hand, it is also true that the percentage of passengers in 
city-pair  markets  with  multiple  carriers  increased.  Figure  6.4  shows 
changes in the percentage of passengers by market type: single-trucking, 
double-trucking,  and triple-trucking routes. After the policy change, the 
share of passengers on multiple-trucking routes increased steadily, reach- 
ing about 72 percent in 1994. In a sense, this means that most passengers 
had  a choice of carrier. But  as stated above, carriers were not  allowed 
flexibility in fare setting, even passengers with access to two or more air- 






















6.3.4  Airfare Trends 
The trend in average domestic airfare since the mid-1970s is shown in 
figure 6.5. In the figure, the average fare is calculated by  dividing total 
revenue by  total  revenue passenger  kilometers for all carriers. Until  re- 
cently, domestic airfares were tightly regulated, and the level of the average 
fare remained relatively stable at least in nominal terms during the 1980s, 
after a hike in  1980 (a result of the second oil crisis in the previous year). 
The fact that prices remained  stable in nominal  terms means that they 
declined  in real terms in general. We  can identify  a downward trend in 
airfares since 1990 in nominal as well as in real terms. In this period, fares 
were still under regulation, but carriers could offer travel agents discount 
fares for inclusive tour programs. Travel agents might well have used this 
kind of fare not only for tour programs but also for seat-only sales, even 
if it was illegal. So we cannot deny the possibility that the downward fare 
trend in  1990 was triggered  by  a relaxation of entry requirements intro- 
duced in the mid-l980s, with a time lag. But it should be noted that in this 
period  the Japanese economy was in depression,  and the fare decrease 
could be a result of the weak economy. At any case, air passengers in Japan 
did not realize any benefits from competition, and their dissatisfaction led 
to demands for a relaxation of fare regulation. 
As noted above, a zone fare system was introduced after I  June 1996. 
Judging from its early results, we cannot say that consumers’ expectations 
were realized. Fares under the new system were almost the same among 
carriers, and on some routes, fares actually rose. For example, the W3,100 
($399) normal round-trip fare for the Tokyo-Sapporo route rose by 85,400 
to 86,600 ($50 to $60; the increase depends on the carrier and the period 
I 
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Fig. 6.5  Trend in average airfare 
Note: Average airfare was calculated as total passenger revenue divided by  total revenue 
passenger kilometers. 
of use). In addition, since the carriers abolished round-trip discounts with 
no restrictions, the degree of the price rise was significant. Although fares 
for some routes fell, these were few in number and only a small percentage 
of passengers enjoyed the benefits. 
Criticism of the new fare structure was particularly vocal among local 
business travelers, who are among the airlines' best customers-for  ex- 
ample, discount fares had been offered only for the off-season. The airlines 
attempted to dodge criticism by  saying that they would in the future be 
offering an even greater array of  discount fares. Over the several weeks 
following the system's commencement, JAS dropped  its fares on some 
routes, expanded the scope of its discount fares, and eased restrictions. 
The other airlines followed suit immediately. 
In spring 1997, the MOT  reported a comparison of the average domestic 
fare under the new zone fare system with that of the previous year (see fig. 
6.6). According to MOT  data, the average fare, which is revenue divided 
by revenue passenger kilometers, declined by 2.3 percent in nominal terms. 
Since general consumer prices remained fairly stable during this period, 
we  can regard this decline as a real price decrease. A price drop of 2.3 
percent does not seem trivial because the annual rate of decline in U.S. 
domestic airfares since deregulation has been 2.8 percent in real terms.* 
However, it is not clear that this price decline was brought about mainly 
8. According to Air Transport Association data, the average US.  airfare in 1977 was 13.4$ 
per passenger mile, and this declined to 8.076 in 1995 (calculated in constant 1982 dollars). 208  Hirotaka Yamauchi 
Fig. 6.6  Domestic average airfare (in nominal terms) 
through the new fare zone system. As stated above, the average domestic 
fare started to decline in 1990, and the price fall between 1994 and 1995 
was 3.5 percent in both nominal and real terms. 
Judging from aggregate data, it is true that domestic airfares in Japan 
have tended to decline at a nontrivial rate, but consumers cannot see bene- 
fits from these fare changes. We  may point out several reasons for this 
discrepancy between what is suggested by  the data and what consumers 
feel. The most important point seems to be that the absolute airfare level 
in Japan is higher than in any other country, especially the United  state^.^ 
6.3.5  Cost Behavior 
One of the purposes of the 1986 policy change was to strengthen the 
airlines’ competitiveness or to make them efficient by promoting competi- 
9. Note that international comparisons of domestic airfares are always difficult. E.g., the 
MOT  of Japan reported that normal fares in Japan are generally lower than in the United 
States and that advance purchase discount fares are almost at the same level as in the United 
States, comparing similar routes. According to a news release from the Air Transport Associ- 
ation, however, 92.0 percent of all air passengers in the United States made use of some kind 
of discounted fare, and the average discount was 67.0 percent off the full fare (ATA Press 
Release no. 115, December 1995). Thus the simple comparison of published fares is almost 
meaningless. Moreover, the average domestic yield of US. carriers in 1995 was about 8.04 
yen per passenger kilometer (12.866 per passenger mile). On the other hand, the yield of 
Japanese carriers was 19.4 yen. If we  compare these yields without any manipulation, the 
average fare in Japan is more than twice as high as in the United States. But the average 
route length in U.S. domestic markets is longer than in Japan, and the average fare is thought 
to decline as route length grows. So in this case too, a simple comparison has no meaning. Toward a More Liberal Sky in Japan  209 
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Fig. 6.7  Changes in unit costs (in real terms) 
tion among air carriers. This would benefit consumers through market 
competition. Did the policy change affect the airlines’ cost level? 
Figure 6.7 shows changes in  the big three carriers’ unit costs in real 
terms. Unit costs are determined not only by the operational efficiency of 
the carrier but also by route structure and air fleet structure. As the aver- 
age route length grows, unit cost might well decline, and also bigger air- 
craft could lower average cost. Because airlines in Japan have not had 
complete freedom to adjust their route structures, it is not proper to com- 
pare these three unit costs with each other in a straightforward way.  So 
the trend of costs is more important to observe. 
Figure 6.7 shows a downward slope for all unit cost curves. But since the 
declining trend started far before the regulatory policy change, we cannot 
conclude that the policy change had a positive effect on airline efficiency. 
By  a brief statistical cost test done by  the author, it was shown that the 
unit costs of JAL and ANA might have been affected by the new policy 
but that JAS’s  unit cost might not have been (see Yamauchi  1997, ap- 
pendix). 
JAL entered into many domestic city-pair markets after the new policy 
was introduced. JAL‘s new markets were relatively large ones because, as 
stated earlier, the MOT  adopted a standard for new entry based on annual 
number of passengers carried. This made it possible for JAL to use wide- 
body aircraft on new routes as in international markets, and so JAL could 
also enjoy the economies associated with  large aircraft. The increased 
number of domestic routes reduced average route length, which could be 210  Hirotaka Yamauchi 
a factor that increased cost. But JAL was always under pressure in interna- 
tional markets to compete with foreign low-cost carriers and, moreover, 
was completely privatized under the new policy. These elements are likely 
to have offset the bad effects of entering new domestic markets. 
The reason why  the new policy decreased ANA's  unit cost seems very 
clear: ANA started international service to Washington, D.C., and other 
American  cities in  1986. Generally  speaking, international  routes  are 
longer than Japanese domestic routes, and larger aircraft are used in order 
to make operations more efficient. Entry into international markets might 
reduce average cost, and this was probably the case for ANA's  cost be- 
havior. 
As stated above, we  cannot say that the average cost of JAS was influ- 
enced by  the new policy. With respect to route structure, JAS had flown 
both trunk routes and local routes under the old regime. The new policy 
made it possible for JAS to enter new markets, but its route structure was 
not changed. JAS was also allowed to commence international operation, 
and it started some routes. Its new international routes were, however, 
short range and could have become a factor in decreasing costs. 
Judging from this brief cost analysis and the changes observed in the 
situation, we  can say that the cost behavior of JAS could reflect the net 
effect of newly introduced competitive policy in Japan because its route 
network  characteristics  were  unchanged.  By  contrast,  the  new  policy 
changed ANA's  route structure greatly, and caused JAL's complete priva- 
tization. These elements were likely to bring down their cost levels, and 
probably it is appropriate to distinguish these effects from the pure com- 
petitive pressures released by the policy, because these elements can affect 
the cost level  technically-although  complete privatization would have 
some competitive aspects. In summary, the new air transport policy intro- 
duced in 1986 generated favorable effects on Japanese air carriers' average 
costs overall, but it is not clear whether or not these effects were brought 
about  through  the  substantial  competitive  process  expected  from  the 
economists' view point.l0 
6.3.6 
In  evaluating deregulation  policy  in  the  United  States,  it  is  always 
pointed out that carriers have adopted several new competitive strategies 
to establish advantageous market positions and that these strategies have 
decreased the validity of the deregulation policy. Above all, it is said that 
the most influential strategies are computer reservation systems (CRSs), 
frequent  flyer programs  (FFPs), and hub and  spoke network  systems 
(HSNSs). CRSs made it possible for airlines to adopt detailed marketing 
plans and, consequently, segmented pricing strategies, while we  can also 
Competitive Strategy and Entry Barriers 
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regard CRSs as a tool allowing consumers to get the information neces- 
sary to make rational choices. FFPs brought consumers many benefits, in 
the form of price discounts; on the other hand, it increased the cost to an 
air passenger of switching airline companies. In other words, FFPs are a 
very powerful way for airlines to capture their customers. 
With respect to CRSs and FFPs, Japanese air carriers are in the infant 
stage. Each carrier group has its own CRS but has failed to use that sys- 
tem, at least for domestic operations. A large portion of air tickets are sold 
by  travel agents, in the form of inclusive tours. In these cases, it is travel 
agents who determine prices, not airlines. This means that Japanese air- 
lines do not have the power or the ability to segment their market and to 
set prices for each market. This aspect of Japanese airline operation seems 
to be quite different from that of foreign carriers. Japanese airlines have 
not been especially active in introducing FFPs. Until recently, their FFPs 
were quite limited and far from being used strategically in a competitive 
environment. For example, all domestic FFPs were separate from interna- 
tional FFPs, and domestic awards were poor. In spring 1997, the airlines 
introduced new comprehensive FFPs, patterned on American programs, 
but it is too early to determine the effects of these new programs. 
It is obvious that the strongest barrier to new competition is the landing 
slot shortage at Haneda Airport. In the United States, the HSNSs adopted 
by larger carriers led to concentration at hub airports, and some studies 
pointed  out that this concentration  works  as an effective entry barrier 
(e.g., see U.S. GAO 1996). In Japan, as stated above, the major routes are 
connected  to Haneda, and the key  factor in each airline’s ability to be 
profitable is its landing slot allocation  at Haneda. Although the landing 
capacity of Haneda has expanded gradually, at any given time all slots are 
fully utilized by incumbent carriers. In this situation, it is hardly possible 
for a new competitor to enter the domestic market successfully and be an 
active competitor. Therefore, slot allocation at Haneda is an essential fac- 
tor in promoting competition in the domestic air transport market. 
In allocating landing slots at Haneda, the MOT’S  approach is as follows. 
First, landing slots at Haneda are property belonging to the state, and the 
government has the power to allocate them at its own discretion. Second, 
landing slots should be allocated in connection with route licenses or busi- 
ness plan approval. Thus, if a carrier wants to get a new landing slot, it 
first should offer a new service to the MOT. Then it can get a slot only 
when the MOT  approves the proposed service as meeting the “public ne- 
cessity and convenience” condition or contributing to the “public interest” 
and as not disturbing the supply-demand balance in the market.” The last 
requirement, called the “supply-demand balance regulation,” is specified 
1  I. Of course, in addition to these requirements, technological conditions including safety 
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in the Civil Aeronautics Law and is interpreted as the main source of the 
central government’s discretionary power.” 
Clearly, this allocation procedure will never promote effective competi- 
tion because it is the MOT  and not the airlines that decides what kinds of 
products and how much output should be supplied. As stated in section 
6.2, since 1986 the MOT  has tried to facilitate double or triple trucking 
of existing carriers. This policy, however, cannot generate a competitive 
environment as long as landing slots at Haneda are allocated at adminis- 
trative discretion. 
Faced with the sharp economic decline after the collapse of the “bubble 
economy,” economists began to claim that the rigid Japanese administra- 
tive process and wide-ranging regulatory framework were obstacles to the 
self-supporting recovery of the Japanese economy. This argument spurred 
a  social  movement  eager  for  administrative reform,  and  through  this 
movement, the landing slot allocation at Haneda Airport came into the 
limelight. A new runway at Haneda was approaching completion, and it 
would clearly bring a substantial increase in the number of landing slots- 
enough to influence competitive conditions in the domestic air transport 
industry. 
Responding to public opinion, the MOT  established a consultative com- 
mittee to consider slot allocation at Haneda. At the same time several 
proposals were made to establish wholly new, independent airlines and to 
allow entry into major domestic routes (e.g., Tokyo-Sapporo and Tokyo- 
Osaka) with cheaper fares. The committee recommended that new slots 
be allocated independent of route licenses or approval of business plans 
and that the allocating procedure be transparent and procompetitive. In 
particular, it was proposed that newcomers be given priority in getting 
Haneda’s slots. The MOT  accepted these proposals, and some slots were 
reserved for new entrants.  l3 But crucial issues remained-among  them, 
how to allocate the remaining slots to the three incumbent groups. 
The MoT’s decision was as follows: slots at Haneda would be allocated 
to the three carrier groups in inverse proportions to each carrier’s landing 
slot share. Moreover, some slots given to ANA were conditioned on the 
destinations being fixed in order to ensure service provision to thin routes 
and new airports.  This procedure was the same as under conventional 
slot allocation. 
The MOT  insisted that the landing slot inequality at Haneda was a leg- 
acy of tight  regulation  and that it was the  MoT’s role to rectify it. As 
shown in figure 6.8, ANA and its subsidiaries use about 49 percent of all 
12. This is the interpretation maintained by Masahiro Yamaguchi, an ex-bureaucrat of the 
13. Until new airlines are ready to operate, reserved slots are provisionally used by incum- 
MOT  he drafted this law in 1952. 
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Fig. 6.8  Slot shares at Haneda Airport 
Haneda’s landing slots. Although ANA’s slot share decreased over the past 
decade, it might be reasonable for other airlines to claim that ANA has a 
competitive advantage in an essential input factor for airline operation. In 
some economic analyses of the air transport market, it is pointed out that 
hub dominance by  an airline is  likely to be an impediment to effective 
competition. 
The slot allocation rule adopted at this time by the MOT  met with criti- 
cism. The contention was that the MOT  intended to rectify artificially or 
administratively differentials in business opportunity that had been built 
up through tight regulation with a long history. Some pointed out that 
concentration  at  Haneda  was  not  as serious  as the experience in  the 
United  States and that  if  trading of landing slots among carriers were 
allowed, allocative efficiency would be improved through this buy-sell pro- 
cess, although some considerations would be necessary for newly estab- 
lished airlines.14  Now the proposal is being made that some portion of the 
existing slots be taken away from carriers and reallocated in order to mo- 
bilize this scarce resource. From the economist’s point of view, some kind 
of price mechanism should be adopted to increase efficiency and to keep 
the reallocation process open and transparent. 
6.3.7  Welfare Change 
In economic analysis, a policy change should be evaluated by the mag- 
nitude of welfare effects the change would bring. In transport market an- 
alysis, a method to estimate passengers’ compensating variations using 
14. E.g., U.S. GAO (1996) reports that at O’Hare Airport in Chicago, which is a typical 
congested airport, American and United  occupied 87 percent  of all landing slots. As for 
noncongested airports, there are examples at which one carrier occupies more than 80 per- 
cent of all slots. The GAO report also claims that the buy-sell rule adopted by the federal 
government for congested airports was likely to reduce competition. 214  Hirotaka Yamauchi 
modal choice functions has been developed and adopted in many stud- 
ies.I5  The modal choice function is a discrete choice model shown in the 
form of a probability, which is a function of an indirect utility function. 
We can estimate the probability of modal choice by specifying the indirect 
utility function. If  a new policy changes the values of, for instance, fare 
levels, service quality, or other variables composing the indirect  utility 
function, the probability  that  passengers choose a particular  transport 
mode will change. We can calculate compensating variations by integrat- 
ing this probabilistic change, multiplying the reciprocal of  the marginal 
utility of income, and summing up this value for every transport mode. 
Unfortunately, I could not properly estimate a welfare change caused 
by the regulatory change mainly because of lack of data. There are two 
ways  to estimate a multinominal logit model: one using aggregate data, 
the other using disaggregate choice data. Theoretically, it is said that the 
latter choice is a better one. In Japan, we cannot get the data needed for 
aggregate estimation of modal choice through published sources, and esti- 
mating a logit model with disaggregate data would require a questionnaire 
survey to obtain stated preference data. The Japan Transport Economic 
Research Center (1991), an extradepartmental body of the MOT,  has pub- 
lished estimated results of nested logit mode choice models. A special 
study group composed of transportation engineers did this research in 
cooperation with the MOT,  and the MOT  used the results in making a new 
transport plan during the 1990s. Since the mode choice models adopted 
in this research are part of a four-stage transport demand projection and 
did not take account of economic analysis, we cannot use them to evaluate 
welfare change. If we  try to estimate welfare gains (gross consumer sur- 
plus) caused by the introduction of the zone fare system quite roughly, the 
results are as follows.16 
According to the simple demand function  given in section 6.3.1, the 
long-term price elasticity of air travel in Japan is -0.741,  and the average 
airfare decreased 2.3 percent after the introduction of the zone fare sys- 
tem. A quite simple calculation gives the result that the decrease in prices 
gives birth to a demand increase of about 1.7 percent, income being held 
constant, and thus all passengers enjoy somewhat cheaper fares. The re- 
sulting change in aggregate consumer surplus would be about $29.3 billion 
($266 million) per year. This estimated gain seems very small compared 
with the gains reported in  several studies of airline deregulation in  the 
United States.17  As stated earlier, we cannot conclude that this price reduc- 
15. The method is developed in Small and Rosen (1981). On its application, see Morrison 
16. It should be noted that the following analysis is tentative and not conclusive. 
17. Morrison and Winston (1986) estimate “total annual benefit to travelers of $5.7 billion 
or 35 percent of actual 1977 airline revenue of $16.3 billion.” Morrison and Winston’s  estima- 
tion is comprehensive, and we cannot make a simple comparison. 
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tion was brought about solely by the new regulatory system; therefore, the 
estimation here is hypothetical. 
6.4  Revolution of International Air Transport 
International air transport is carried out based on bilateral agreements 
that reflect the reciprocal rights and interests of each country. As often 
pointed  out, in  the bilateral system each country asserts its rights and 
interests, and so the equilibrium of negotiation is likely to result in a traffic 
level lower than is efficient. This is because the country with less competi- 
tive, less efficient carriers might well try to protect its airlines and try to 
delimit markets within which its carriers can make profits. 
An international cartel, initiated by the International Air Transport As- 
sociation (IATA), stabilized international airfares and avoided substantial 
competition. It is true that IATA itself still exists and that traffic confer- 
ences of IATA are held regularly to set fares route by  route, but IATA's 
ability to tame competition has been much reduced and its main role has 
sifted to cooperative functions such as acting as the clearinghouse for debt 
and credit between airlines. As a result, the degree of competition in inter- 
national markets depends on the bilateral agreements, especially the ca- 
pacity control clauses of these agreements. 
The Japanese government has held to a rather traditional policy stance 
in international aviation negotiations. However, as stated above, air trans- 
port policy reached a turning point in 1986, when the Council for Trans- 
port Policy, which consisted of neutral members, submitted a report that 
showed a new direction for aviation policy of Japan. With respect to inter- 
national aviation, the report advised that multiple designations should be 
extended to markets on a reciprocal basis. The background of this coun- 
cil's report was the provisional agreement with the United States made in 
the previous year, in which new carriers from both Japan and the United 
States were allowed to enter markets. By  this agreement, ANA and JAS 
became international carriers,  and United Airlines, American  Airlines, 
and Delta Airlines started to fly in Japan-U.S. markets. 
Indeed, this provisional agreement was not a liberal agreement that gave 
carriers much freedom of capacity and price setting, but it should be noted 
that it triggered a change in Japanese air transport policy. And this was the 
starting point for a relaxation of conditions for new entry and a capacity 
expansion in international air transport markets with other countries. This 
is very clear, if we think of the Japan-U.S. negotiation process. 
The  Japan-U.S.  provisional  agreement  did  not  become  a  liberal 
agreement because the Japanese government believed that there existed an 
inequality of rights and interests in the Japan-U.S. bilateral agreement, 
and that this inequality hampered fair competition in the air transport 
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follows. First, in the original agreement, the United States had unlimited 
fifth freedom rights (“beyond rights”) beyond Japan, while Japan had only 
one point of that right beyond the United States. Second, the number of 
full-right carriers for the United States was greater than for Japan. Full- 
right carriers can increase or decrease capacity without advance notice. 
Third, there was an imbalance in capacity shares in north Pacific markets. 
Fourth, as a result, U.S. carriers had higher market shares than Japanese 
carriers over the Pacific. 
If this characterization were accurate, it would have been quite natural 
for the Japanese government to insist that liberalizing the agreement with 
the United  States would benefit U.S.  carriers. However, not all of these 
assertions are thought to be appropriate. As many researchers point out, 
at least as far as imbalances in capacity share and market share, one cause 
of such imbalances is that Japanese carriers failed to expand their capacity. 
It is true that beyond rights are unequal between the two countries, but 
these rights are not as attractive to Japanese carriers as to U.S. carriers 
because there seems to be no lucrative market for Japanese carriers in 
beyond-U.S. routes. 
Generally speaking, complaints from foreign countries about Japanese 
international aviation policy focus on the difficulty of entering the Japa- 
nese markets or increasing their capacity. These complaints are thought 
to stem partly from Japan’s policy itself and largely from airport conges- 
tion problems.’s 
The negotiating process between Japan and the United  States shows 
that it is not easy to liberalize international air transport through bilateral 
agreements. In order to conclude liberal agreements, a coincidence of in- 
terests between the countries or substantial concessions by  one country 
are needed. In the case of the liberal agreement concluded between the 
Netherlands  and the United  States in the summer of  1992, the United 
States was after the symbolic effects of this agreement on other European 
countries and the Netherlands made use of the negotiation to strengthen 
the global alliance of KLM and Northwest Airlines. 
Any equilibrium based on a point of compromise will be unstable; thus 
a new apparatus is needed in order to liberalize regulatory frameworks 
in the international setting. Some proponents suggest that a multilateral 
agreement or treaty would be better  scheme for achieving institutional 
change directed to a more liberal environment in international aviation. 
In a multilateral setting, unified standards for regulatory operations would 
be concluded, and regulatory operations would become more transparent. 
Apparently, this trend contributes to liberalization. The U.S. government 
points out its validity, proposing it in some international organizations. 
18. For  a detailed discussion of the US.-Japan  bilateral  agreement, see Yamauchi and 
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At this time, several multilateral  agreements in international  aviation 
have been concluded. The Chicago Convention in  1944, the starting point 
of the international aviation system after World War 11, itself is a multilat- 
eral treaty, although it has no economic regulatory framework. In 1980, 
the United States and the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) 
signed a memorandum of understanding on passenger-fare-setting rules. 
Since the ECAC is the representative organization of the aviation depart- 
ments of European countries, this memorandum of understanding was the 
first multilateral agreement relating to economic regulations on airlines. In 
1992, the Council of Transport Ministers in the European  Community 
(now the European Union) adopted the third package of the Common 
Air Transport Policy, which deregulated the whole European air transport 
market substantially. This was a typical multilateral agreement to liberal- 
ize international aviation. 
Ideally, a multilateral scheme is the most favorable apparatus for liberal- 
izing and developing international  air transport.  However, it should be 
noted that it is extremely difficult to get to a multilateral framework. In 
the EU case, where the Common Air Transport Policy was introduced, 
the new system was strongly initiated by the European Commission, the 
administrative body of the European Union. This is because the Common 
Air Transport Policy brings the commissioners huge benefits in the form 
of centralized  authority over policy operations. Actors as aggressive as 
these commissioners are rare in general economic settings. A particular 
country cannot be a promoter of  multilateral agreements because there 
emerge keen conflicts of interest. The multilateral approach was discussed 
at the International Civil Aviation Organization meeting in 1994, but only 
limited approval was obtained. Tn  conclusion, to liberalize international 
aviation, a multilateral approach is the right way,  but to accomplish it, 
gradual reform will be needed. 
Another apparatus for liberalizing international air transport is compe- 
tition in a domestic market itself. As pointed out by Kasper (1996), in the 
United  States, air carriers started to optimize their route networks and 
operations when faced with the competitive environment created by dereg- 
ulation in 1978, and now the route networks to be optimized include inter- 
national routes. The globalization of national economies as a whole make 
it crucial for airlines to construct global networks in order to be competi- 
tive. This in turn requires a more liberal framework for international avia- 
tion. We  can see evidence of such an industry-oriented  procompetitive 
policy in the United States. In any case, the important thing is not who 
advocates the policy, but how good is the market performance, or alloca- 
tive efficiency, brought about by the policy. 
Regrettably, in the case of the Japanese air transport industry, competi- 
tion in the domestic market is not severe enough to force the airlines to 
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make them more attractive to passengers. In fact, although ANA always 
expresses its desire to extend its international routes, these extension plans 
seem to be within an existing bilateral framework. The high-cost  nature 
of Japanese carriers makes it more attractive to remain within the existing 
framework, and also limited competition in the market keeps carriers in 
inefficient operation. 
6.5  Outlook for Japan’s Air Transport Policy: A Conclusion 
On 5 December 1996, the MOT  announced a new direction for trans- 
port policy, including air transport. The contents of the announcement 
were as follows. The supply-demand balance clause included in the Civil 
Aeronautics Law would  be abolished in a year or so. The new landing 
slots created by completion of the new runway at Haneda Airport would 
be allocated through a transparent process and in a procompetitive way, 
and some portion of the existing slots would be transferred among airlines 
to make competition more workable.  In a sense, this  statement  can be 
regarded as a drastic policy change, because the supply-demand balance 
clause gives administrative power to the MOT and the capacity limit at 
Haneda is the bottleneck hindering effective competition. 
The supply-demand balance clause provides that a new entry or an in- 
cremental flight by  an incumbent carrier will be approved if and only if 
the authority judges that the balance of supply and demand in the market 
will not be disturbed by the new entry or additional flight. This is a quanti- 
tative control on supply, and the clause has effectively blocked new entry. 
The clause has also given the MOT  wide-ranging administrative discretion 
because, according to the clause, it is not airline managers but government 
officials who decide whether there is excess demand or not. Thus the aboli- 
tion of the clause could mean much more room for effective competition 
than in the present situation, and this prospect could be strengthened by 
the new policy statement on slot allocation at Haneda. 
However, it should be noted that the MOT’S  “new new policy” is not 
an American-type total deregulation policy. It is possible that the present 
licensing scheme will remain substantially, although its statutory expres- 
sion might differ from the present one. Therefore, the wide range of ad- 
ministrative discretion may remain unchanged. The trigger for the “new 
new policy” was a policy recommendation made by the Deregulation Sub- 
committee of the Administrative Reform committee, which is a consulta- 
tive committee for the prime minister. The subcommittee advocated more 
comprehensive deregulation, but the MOT  did not agree with the original 
proposal. Since the “new new policy” is the result of compromise between 
the subcommittee and the MOT, it is ambiguous what direction the MOT 
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In this paper, it was shown that Japan’s air transport policy has evolved 
gradually to a more liberal and procompetitive approach. However, the 
speed of the evolution has been very slow. In the domestic market, the 
legacy of the old regime remains, and the market  structure has hardly 
changed. The effects of regulatory change in the past decade were evalu- 
ated, but the results are not clear, and the estimated welfare gain is very 
small. 
Japan is still a traditionalist in international aviation policy. It is true 
that  faced with policy change, airlines were forced to restructure their 
businesses and make them lean, but it seems to me that the airlines’ re- 
sponse to the new situation has been “too little, too slow.”19 
In March 1998, Japan and the United States agreed to a new memoran- 
dum of understanding. In the negotiation process, while the United States 
government strongly insisted that Japan accept a liberal agreement, since 
the Japanese government refused it persistently the memorandum of un- 
derstanding was not said to be a liberal agreement. The official reason why 
Japan opposed a liberal agreement was that there remained inequalities of 
rights and interests in the bilateral agreement mentioned in section 6.4. 
However, the essence of the memorandum of understanding was to in- 
troduce  greater  competition  into  the  north  Pacific market.  The  new 
agreement allows full-right carriers to choose any city-pair  market be- 
tween the two countries if there is no landing slot problem, to exercise 
beyond rights more freely than at present, and to make use of code sharing 
even between same-country carriers. Moreover, the agreement equalizes 
the number of full-right carriers between the two countries, which meets 
Japan’s complaint  about  inequality  in  the original  bilateral agreement, 
while  for non-full-right  carriers,  flight increases are allowed.  The new 
agreement was reached with substantial compromises by both countries, 
but it is certain that competition among carriers will increase, and in- 
creased competition will benefit consumers as well as the air carriers them- 
selves. 
It is often pointed out that the Japanese government has always behaved 
in  a  paternalistic  manner,  especially in  the  industrial policy field, and 
probably this is true for the air transport industry. Given that the Ameri- 
can economy was revitalized through competitive market processes and 
that newly industrializing countries are strengthening their international 
competitiveness quickly, Japan’s stance in industrial and regulatory policy 
should not be the same as in previous days. And clearly, air transport 
policy is no exception. 
19. On the airlines’ strategy for the new situation, see Yamauchi (1993). 220  Hirotaka Yamauchi 
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Comment  Takatoshi Ito 
Hirotaka Yamauchi gives a good description of the deregulation process 
in the airline industry in Japan. He covers the prolonged process of dereg- 
ulation up to the current state (1997-98).  Airlines in Japan, before 1986, 
were  severely  limited in their pricing  and routing (like their American 
counterparts before the U.S. deregulation of 1978). It is interesting to note 
(as described in detail by  Yamauchi) that  the domestic deregulation of 
1986 was triggered by  international negotiations in which Japan pushed 
to introduce a new cargo airline. Hence, even the deregulation of the late 
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1980s was the result of international pressure rather than of an internal 
debate. 
The paper is modest in its critical evaluation of the deregulation process. 
I would argue that deregulation was too slow. If the MOT  had been bold 
enough to deregulate prices and routes completely in the mid-l980s, when 
they abandoned the old regime (JAL for international routes, ANA for 
domestic  routes,  and TDA for  regional  routes),  the airline companies 
would have been forced to compete fiercely at a time when business as a 
whole was still booming. Instead, their costs-increased  wages for pilots 
and flight attendants (rent sharing with workers) and burdens from in- 
efficient subsidiaries-increased  during the “bubble economy” period in 
the late 1980s. This made Japanese airlines less competitive by  interna- 
tional standards. As the U.S. airline industry consolidated  in  the early 
1990s, it became apparent that it was more cost-effective in competition 
over the Pacific. The share of U.S. carriers significantly increased in the 
1990s. 
Major innovations in U.S. airline services, such as HSNSs, deep dis- 
counts with early purchases and conditions, and effective use of CRSs, 
have not developed in Japan. Routing and pricing had been deregulated 
in steps in the mid-1990s. As of spring 1998, discounts of up to 50 percent 
off  the regular fare became possible. Routing innovation has not taken 
place. Airfares have been declining markedly. 
What is needed in evaluating Japanese airline policy is a quantitative 
evaluation  of  consumer  benefits  from  various  deregulation  measures. 
Yamauchi’s paper scratches the surface of  this issue when he shows the 
trend of average domestic airfare measured as operating revenue divided 
by passenger kilometers (fig. 6.5). Ideally, airfares should be compared for 
each market  or for the same distances, since marginal cost declines as 
distance grows. Difficulties in estimating consumer benefits remain. The 
value of increased frequency of service, through check-in, and other inno- 
vations in airline service is difficult to capture. 
Advocates of deregulation faced  resistance in Japan. Those who are 
against deregulation cite the danger of cutting service to remote islands 
(due to the end of cross-subsidization), thus threatening universal service, 
and the potentially increased probability of airline accidents due to cuts 
in maintenance costs. The role of economists is to provide objective evalu- 
ations of these claims and accurate accounts of the U.S. experience with 
airline deregulation.’ This paper is a first step toward this kind of critical 
evaluation of deregulation. 
I. On the U.S. experience with airline deregulation, see, e.g., Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan 
(1985) and Morrison and Winston (1986). 222  Hirotaka Yamauchi 
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Comment  Changqi Wu 
The relationship between the development of the airline industry and the 
evolution of national air transport policy is full of controversy. There seem 
no compelling efficiency reasons, such as the economies of scale that give 
rise to natural monopolies in the electricity supply industry, to  justify tight 
government regulation. Nevertheless, governments all over the world have 
taken measures, in one period or another, to regulate and to protect the 
air transport industry from its birth. European countries under the flag 
carrier system legitimized the state ownership of airlines with hidden gov- 
ernment subsidies. In the United  States, it was through airmail delivery 
that government subsidies were sneaked in. In all those years, the airline 
industry was under tight regulation regarding routes,  landing slots, and 
fares. The lack of competition led to high airfares and less frequent ser- 
vice. Air travel became a luxury enjoyed by only a few. 
Starting in 1978 in the United States, a fundamental change took place 
in the airline industry. Since then,  “deregulation”  and “open sky” have 
become the buzzwords of air transport policymakers. The deregulation of 
the airline industry has raised new questions and challenges and enriched 
the literature of regulatory economics and antitrust economics. Studies of 
problems in the airline industries, old and new, improve our understand- 
ing.’ Unfortunately, the bulk of this literature is based on the experiences 
of the United States and European countries. Little has been written on 
what has happened in Japan. 
Hirotaka Yamauchi provides a concise review of the evolutionary pro- 
cess that has taken place in the Japanese domestic airline industry over 
the past forty-five years. He also highlights the three phases of this evolu- 
tion and comments critically on two policy initiatives of the Japanese gov- 
ernment. These initiatives have helped to shape the current market struc- 
ture of the airline industry in Japan. 
Unlike the big bang approach to deregulation taken in the U.S. airline 
industry,  the market  liberalization  process  in Japan  has  been  slow and 
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piecemeal. The author discusses the three phases in air transport policy: 
(1) In the 1972-86  period, the relatively free entry of the 1950s was re- 
placed by a so-called aviation constitution that put in place a market struc- 
ture of three airlines. These airlines divided all routes and created essen- 
tially a monopoly in each of three segmented markets. (2) In the 1986--96 
period, the territorial monopolies were challenged and replaced by  con- 
trolled competition among domestic airlines over routes, fares, and ser- 
vices. (3) From 1996 onward, a new initiative was introduced. As we learn 
from the paper, the 1996 policy initiative clearly represents a more pro- 
found policy shift than the previous ones. It is expected to bring funda- 
mental changes to the industry in the years to come. However, it seems to 
be too early at this stage, as the author points out, for these changes to 
have any significant effects that are empirically testable. Partly for this 
reason, he devotes much of the paper to discussing the rather limited pol- 
icy  changes in  1986. In the following, I shall comment on Yamauchi’s 
study. 
Market Structure and Competition 
Because competition between airlines is  largely based on routes, it is 
weak unless more than one airline serves the same route. One of the most 
important policy issues is whether the government should allow multiple 
carriers to serve the same route. This issue has arisen again and again in 
Japan over the past forty-five years. For instance, after a number of new 
airlines entered the market in the 1950s, it was the Japanese government 
that facilitated the creation of a superstable market structure that divided 
the whole domestic market into three different market segments. The MOT 
then allocated these routes among three airlines. 
The MOT  was clearly aware in the 1970s that following rapid growth in 
demand for air travel, the market was large enough to accommodate more 
competing airlines. At the same time, it was concerned about the degree 
of concentration in the industry. That explains why the MOT  insisted on 
the creation of a third airline instead allowing the mergers of the two weak 
airlines into the two stronger ones in 1970. Nevertheless, the MOT  through 
its administrative instructions made sure that there was no effective route 
competition among the airlines. Instead, the three airlines operated as sep- 
arate monopolies, each in its segmented market. The experience of Japan’s 
airline industry provides one more piece  of evidence that  government- 
engineered market structure changes do not lead to effective competition. 
Neither consumers nor society as a whole benefited from the potential 
improvement in economic efficiency. 
Airfare Scheme as a Barrier to Entry 
In a competitive market, the balance of demand and supply conditions 
establishes the price level. A price level maintained by  a cartel arrange- 224  Hirotaka Yamauchi 
ment is higher  than that determined  by competitive market conditions. 
Thus it cannot be sustained without an enforcement mechanism. Govern- 
ment regulation of the airfare system not only endorsed this airfare system 
but might actually have created it. The tight regulation of airfares consti- 
tuted a major barrier to entry in the sense that potential entrants could not 
use price as a means to attract customers and expand their market shares. 
After the new policy initiative in  1986, there existed a limited degree of 
competition over airfare. The author describes briefly the trend in average 
airfare level calculated based on total revenue and total passenger kilome- 
ters traveled. If the author had provided detailed information on changes 
in airfares and how the airlines set their fares, readers would have a better 
clue to whether airfares were used as competitive weapons. Readers could 
also assess the impact of competition if  given detailed information  on 
changes in prices on different  types of  routes. It would  be particularly 
interesting to link airfares with operating costs of airlines, given the dif- 
ferences in cost structure among Japanese airlines. In the 1996 policy ini- 
tiative, MOT  introduced into the domestic market a zone fare system that 
allows diversities of airfares on different routes. This may improve eco- 
nomic efficiency as long as these fares are set by a well-designed auction 
mechanism. 
Analysis of Cost of Japanese Airlines 
In an attempt to assess the effect of government policy changes in 1986, 
the author has estimated the parameters of a model for Japanese carriers’ 
unit costs. What is not clear in this exercise is the time period covered. 
The  discussion  of  the economic  reasons  for  the  cost  reduction  seems 
murky The author attempts to explain the decline in unit cost by econo- 
mies of  scale due to differences in aircraft size. Because a large aircraft 
can carry more passengers than a small one, large airlines therefore enjoy 
more benefits from economies of scale. When looking at the measurement 
of unit cost, we can see that it is both numbers of passengers and travel 
distances that matter. One should distinguish the impacts from the two 
sources. As pointed out by  the author, international competition plays a 
crucial role in determining the unit cost level of Japanese airlines. Airlines 
exposed to international competition are forced to be competitive in the 
international market. They can learn from their experiences in interna- 
tional  operations  to improve  their  competitive  positions  on domestic 
routes. These airlines can definitely benefit from such experiences in terms 
of more efficient flight scheduling and other aspects of management. It is 
not very clear why this reason is used to explain the unit cost decline of 
JAL but not that of ANA. As stated in the discussion, ANA entered the 
international market as a result of the 1986 government policy initiative. 
After obtaining long-haul flight routes, ANA also faced the pressure of 
international competition.  Such pressure  should have contributed posi- Toward a More Liberal Sky in Japan  225 
tively to cost-cutting  efforts at ANA. One possible  way  to capture this 
effect is to introduce a dummy variable to capture the difference in charac- 
teristics of the airlines. 
Vertical Relations between Airlines, Travel Agencies, and Airports 
As we  learn  from other papers  in  this  volume,  there  existed various 
degrees of inefficiency in the Japanese distribution system. Those deficien- 
cies may constitute a kind of barrier to entry, protecting upstream manu- 
facturers from potential entrants and alleviating competition among in- 
cumbents. The relation between the airlines and the travel agencies can 
also be regarded as such a vertical relation. The author’s discussion of the 
relation between airlines and the ticketing  agencies is interesting. Given 
the fact that there are only three airlines and must be a large number of 
travel agencies, it is surprising to learn that travel agencies determine the 
level of airfares. Unless these travel agencies are well organized or there 
are professional associations to coordinate prices,  it is hard to imagine 
that airfares are determined by travel agencies instead of airlines. 
Another interesting  issue is how  to allocate  airport landing slots. In 
addition to the typical efficient allocation issue, airlines may also use land- 
ing rights and landing slots as a kind of barrier to entry. The experiences 
with deregulation in the United States and theoretical studies show that it 
is possible to design an efficient auction mechanism (Grether, Isaac, and 
Plott  1989). Unfortunately, the author does not provide information  de- 
tailed enough for readers to understand how landing slots were allocated 
at Japanese airports. 
Overall this is a useful paper. Yamauchi not only analyzes the evolution 
of the airline industry in Japan but also makes predictions about future 
developments. 1 am sure readers can  benefit from his insights into the 
evolution of the policy environment in Japan. 
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